This paper updates and extends the study of Chan et al. (2006) 
serve as the main clientele for many local auditors. This makes local auditors politically vulnerable.
The enforcement of laws across China is different because of regional differences in the development of the legal infrastructure and level of marketization. In regions where the underlying institutional features of market development are not firmly in place to discipline participants, audit collusion is likely to occur. We expect that such collusion is most likely to occur between local SOEs and local auditors in regions with a low level of institutional development because the two groups enjoy a close relationship and share common interests. Therefore, we hypothesize that in institutionally weak regions, local auditors are more likely than non-local ones to issue standard unqualified audit opinions to local SOEs, and local auditors in institutionally weak regions are more likely than those in institutionally strong regions to issue unqualified opinions to these companies. This situation is, in a way, parallel to the familiarity threat that affects auditor independence.
Based on 10,481 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2007, our univariate and multivariate results support the hypotheses. To confirm our main findings, we also examine the type of audit opinions that local auditors render to local SOEs in the year following their receipt of a qualified opinion and the subsequent change in auditor. We find that in institutionally weak regions, companies that receive a qualified opinion and subsequently switch to a local auditor are more likely to be successful in obtaining a clean audit opinion than if they switch to a non-local auditor. These findings contribute to the existing audit literature on the effects of government ownership and institutions on the reporting behavior of Chinese local auditors. Chan et al. (2006) find that politically vulnerable local auditors have incentives to report leniently and favorably on local government-owned companies. Extending this finding, we find that it is the combination of local auditor, government ownership, and weak institutional environment that results in more lenient auditor reports. This study also complements auditor choice research conducted in China (e.g., Chan et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2008 . Chan et al. 2007 ) find that a decrease in government shares leads to a general increase in the demand for higher quality audits in China's stock market. Wang et al. (2008) find that SOEs are more likely than non-state firms to hire small local auditors in regions with a lower level of institutional development. While Wang et al. (2008) focus on the demand side of auditing, we examine the reporting behavior of local versus non-local auditors (i.e., the supply side).
We also examine audit opinions rendered after auditor switches to supplement our findings. Our results indicate that the lenient reporting behavior of local auditors induces local SOEs to use their services.
As explained earlier, over the years the Chinese government has implemented measures to induce the demand for and supply of quality audit services. Our results suggest that this twofold objective cannot be achieved simply by the mandating of accounting and auditing standards and regulations.
Parallel development in market institutions, the legal system, and the accounting infrastructure, together with the reform of corporate governance practices and ownership structure, is necessary to This is the post-printed version of an article. The final published version is available at Journal of International Accounting Research 9:2 (2010); doi: 10.2308 /jiar.2010 .9.2.1 ISSN 1542 -6297 (Print) / 1558 -8025 (Online) Copyright © American Accounting Association. Published online: Oct 2010 improve the quality of audit and financial reporting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the institutional background in China for the purpose of hypothesis development. Section III outlines the research methodology and explains the sample selection. Section IV presents the empirical findings and discusses the results. Section V concludes the study.
II. INSTITUTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
In this section, we first describe the NERI index, which we use to classify regions. We then explain how marketization varies across regions in China. Finally, we hypothesize how these variations may affect auditor reporting behavior.
Marketization of China's Provinces
To output, investment in fixed assets, and urban employment-while the second sub-index includes two-market pricing in retail sales of consumer goods, capital goods, and farm products and localtrade protection. To measure institutional environment, we use the last three sub-indexes because they collectively capture the main attributes of a province's market development and are found to affect the choice of auditors in China (e.g., Wang et al. 2008 ). We give a more detailed account of these three measures below.
Government Influence in the Market
This sub-index is constructed based on the following information: 1 government allocation of resources ratio of a provincial government's budgetary expenses to its gross domestic products, 2 government intervention in the business measured by the time spent by entrepreneurs in dealing with bureaucrats, 3 size of the government ratio of government employees to the provincial population, 4 non-tax burden of enterprises e.g., the share of sales spent on gifts or bribes to government agencies, and 5 tax and non-tax burdens of farmers. Provinces and major municipalities are ranked based on these dimensions, and the higher is the score, the lower is the degree of local government intervention in a province or region. According to the index, the score of eastern regions This is the post-printed version of an article. The final published version is available at Journal of International Accounting Research 9:2 (2010); doi: 10.2308 /jiar.2010 .9.2.1 ISSN 1542 -6297 (Print) / 1558 Copyright © American Accounting Association. Published online: Oct 2010 is twice that of western regions. The varying extent of government intervention in local economies is a significant factor in China's institutional heterogeneity. In general, in coastal cities, local governments are more firmly controlled by laws and regulations and implement market-oriented policies rather than issuing discretionary administrative instructions (e.g., Ni 2002).
Factor Market Development
This sub-index comprises five indicators. The first two relate to the development of the financial market, which is measured by the level of deposits in non-state financial institutions as the share of total deposits in the banking sector and the share of bank loans credited to non-state enterprises.
The other three indicators consider foreign direct investment, labor mobility, and technology development. This sub-index reveals a great disparity among different regions in these five dimensions. In general, in coastal cities, firms have more opportunities to raise capital. Creditmarket development across regions in China has been uneven, with rapid development in the eastern provinces and relatively slow development elsewhere. Jin and Qian (1998) find that in areas with a lower level of market development, firms that are more closely affiliated with local governments enjoy more credit advantages.
Intermediate and Legal Environment
This sub-index considers the share of public accountants and lawyers of the local population, legal environment for businesses as perceived by corporate executives, protection of intellectual property rights in terms of patent applications and research and development R&D grants, and protection of consumer rights. The index indicates that China's legal environment is neither well nor uniformly developed in spite of the government's efforts to improve the legal system. Specialist lawyers and reputable law firms are located mainly in the politically and economically developed centers and coastal cities. In the western regions, it is quite difficult to gain access to specialized legal services, especially in rural areas (e.g., Chen 2005) .
Research Hypotheses
Prior studies show that the institutional environment affects financial reporting practices. For example, Ball et al. 2003 find that in more developed markets, information asymmetry is more efficiently resolved through public disclosure and there is a greater demand for high-quality audits.
Francis et al. (2003) and Choi and Wong (2007) document that countries with a poor legal environment generally demand lower-quality audits than do those with a strong legal environment. Chan et al. (2006) find that, because of their political and economic influence over auditor reporting decisions, local governments often prefer to use local auditors as the auditors of companies that they own. Research 9:2 (2010); doi: 10.2308 /jiar.2010 .9.2.1 ISSN 1542 -6297 (Print) / 1558 Copyright © American Accounting Association. Published online: Oct 2010 levels of institutional development has yet to be determined. This study takes advantage of the large cross-regional disparity in institutional development within a single country to examine this issue.
Whether the reporting behavior of Chinese local auditors is uniform across regions with different
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We expect that the variation in the level of institutional development across regions of China will be matched by a corresponding variation in the extent of the leniency of the reporting decisions of local auditors. Specifically, based on the foregoing discussion, we posit that in institutionally weak regions where government intervention in the local economy is heavy, the credit market is underdeveloped, and the legal environment is poor, there is a lack of demand for and supply of quality auditing. Baiman et al. 1991 suggest that for collusion to occur, colluding parties must have interests in common, and collusion costs must be low. As noted, the institutional environment in China gives SOE managers and local auditors incentives to collude. On the one hand, local SOEs have incentives to hire local auditors because of the local government's political power over them to facilitate their initial and subsequent public offerings (e.g., Aharony et al. 2000; Chen et al. 2001; Chen and Yuan 2004) . On the other hand, politically vulnerable local auditors have incentives to report favorably on local government-controlled companies because of their significant economic dependence on them (e.g., Chan et al. 2006) . As local SOEs and local auditors have interests in common, they have incentives to abide by a self-enforcing collusive agreement to protect their own interests. Local SOEs and local auditors also find that their collusion is cost-effective because they both enjoy political patronage that can shield them from the consequences of being caught. Further, collusion costs are lower in regions where the legal environment is poor, costly litigation is rare, and the enforcement mechanism is weak. Although collusion can also occur between other parties e.g., between local auditors and other companies or between non-local auditors and local SOEs and in regions with a high level of institutional development, the likelihood is lower, because potential partners are neither politically nor economically dependent on one another, have no direct control over one another, and face higher collusion costs. Therefore, we propose the following two hypotheses that focus on the behavior of local auditors: H1: When the institutional environment is weak, local auditors are more likely than non-local auditors to issue standard unqualified opinions to local SOEs.
H2: Compared to local auditors in a strong institutional environment, local auditors in a weak institutional environment are more likely to issue standard unqualified opinions to local SOEs.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN Sample Data
The sample initially included 10,594 non-financial firm-year observations for the 1996-2007 period.
We start in 1996, as China's independent auditing standards came into effect that year. Previously, Research 9:2 (2010); doi: 10.2308 /jiar.2010 .9.2.1 ISSN 1542 -6297 (Print) / 1558 -8025 (Online) Copyright © American Accounting Association. Published online: Oct 2010 qualified audit opinions and auditor switching were rare, but they have both increased substantially since then (e.g., Chan et al. 2006) . We retrieve information about auditor identity, audit opinion, client firm characteristics, and share ownership from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and Wind databases. We identify auditor change by ascertaining whether the same auditor audited the company in both years, and treat as a non-change unavoidable auditor change resulting from either a license suspension of the previous auditor due to irregularities or a merger of the incumbent auditor with other auditors. We exclude 66 firm-years in Tibet for which there is no market development index, 25 observations for which the ROE is outside the (+100, -100) range, and 22 observations without data on client firm characteristics. The final sample includes 10,481 observations.
This is the post-printed version of an article. The final published version is available at Journal of International Accounting
To classify regions as institutionally weak or strong, we use the NERI Index of Marketization of China's Provinces that covers nine years from 1997 to 2005 (e.g., Fan and Wang 2001 , 2003 , 2004 Fan et al. 2007 ). We average the scores over the period for the three sub-indexes and label provinces with marks above below the median as institutionally strong (weak) regions. 1 Alternative classifications are discussed in robustness testing. Because the purpose of this research is to determine the overall effect of the institutional environment, we combine the three NERI subindexes. This approach is reasonable, as these sub-indexes are likely to capture similar underlying institutional features, and each sub-index is very stable over time. Nevertheless, we also use three sub-index variables in our robustness tests. We define as qualified audit opinions qualified, disclaimer, and adverse opinions, and unqualified opinions with an explanatory paragraph (e.g., Chan et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2001 ).
Following Chan et al. (2006) , we treat a listed company as a local SOE if its largest shareholder is a local government entity that owns at least 20 percent of the total shares outstanding and consider an auditor to be local if it is located in the same province as the client, and more than 50 percent of the total assets of its clients are owned by clients in the same province as the auditor. According to this classification system, local SOEs and local auditors account for 63 percent and 76 percent, respectively, of the full sample. Table 1 presents the by-year distribution of audit opinion types and auditor changes. The table shows that 9.7 percent of listed companies received a qualified audit opinion over the sample period and To test the likelihood that local auditors will issue unqualified opinions to local SOEs in institutionally weak versus strong regions H2, we restrict the sample to companies audited by local auditors. We then divide this sample into two groups local SOEs and other companies and run separate logistic regressions for each group using the following model:
The dependent variable is as previously defined. The variable of interest in this model is INST, a dummy variable coded 1 if audit firms operate in regions with a low level of institutional development, and 0 otherwise. We expect the sign of the coefficient of this variable to be negative.
All of the control variables are as previously defined. Research 9:2 (2010); doi: 10.2308 /jiar.2010 .9.2.1 ISSN 1542 -6297 (Print) / 1558 -8025 (Online) Copyright © American Accounting Association. Published online: Oct 2010 The lower half of Table 3 Consistent with prior studies, we also find that in general, large companies are less likely to receive qualified reports, whereas less financially secure companies (i.e., lower ROE, higher leverage, and loss making) are more likely to do so (Chan et al. 2006 ).
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Univariate and Multivariate Tests of Hypothesis 1
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We also examine the type of subsequent audit opinions received by the 165 companies that switched auditors in the year immediately following their receipt of a qualified audit opinion. The upper part of Table 4 presents the Chi-square test results, which parallel those presented in Table 3 . Although the statistical power of the Chi-square test is limited by the scarcity of the observations in each panel, the supplemental results are consistent with the main results reported in Table 3 Panel A.
To increase the statistical power, we run only two separate logistic regressions for the institutionally weak and strong region sub-groups (unlike the case in Table 3 ). We introduce an interaction variable, Local * LocSOE, to examine the propensity of local versus non-local auditors to issue clean opinions to SOEs. The significantly negative coefficient of the interaction term suggests that following the receipt of a qualified opinion and subsequent auditor switching, local SOEs have a greater probability of obtaining a subsequent clean opinion from local versus non-local auditors in regions with poor institutional development.
Univariate and Multivariate Tests of Hypothesis 2
To supplement H1, we examine the reporting behavior of local auditors in institutionally weak versus strong regions. As before, we conduct the Chi-square test for preliminary univariate analysis.
As predicted by H2, local auditors in institutionally weak regions are significantly more likely than those in institutionally strong regions to issue unqualified opinions to local SOEs (93.9 percent versus 89.2 percent, respectively, χ 2 = 25.94, p = 0.000, Panel A, Table 5 ).
To provide more convincing evidence, we also perform multivariate analysis. The significantly negative coefficient of the INST variable indicates that the lenient reporting behavior of local auditors with regard to local SOEs is more prevalent in regions with a weak (versus strong) institutional environment. Together with the corroborating evidence provided in Table 3 , the results Journal of International Accounting Research 9:2 (2010); doi: 10.2308 /jiar.2010 .9.2.1 ISSN 1542 -6297 (Print) / 1558 -8025 (Online) Copyright © American Accounting Association. Published online: Oct 2010 consistently suggest that the reporting behavior of local auditors is conditional upon the level of market development of the region in which they operate. The number of control variables that are significant and the significance level of these variables are generally similar to those reported in Table 3 . Table 6 Panel A presents the type of subsequent audit opinions received by the 117 companies that switched to a local auditor after receiving a qualified opinion in the prior year. Again, we find more unqualified opinions for local SOEs that use local auditors in weak (versus strong) institutional regions (68.8 percent versus 36.9 percent, χ 2 = 3.661, p = 0.058).
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Panel B of Table 6 reports the logistic regression results of subsequent opinions for the 117 postswitchers following their receipt of a qualified opinion. Again, to increase the statistical power, we include all client firms (local SOEs and others) in the regression model. As expected, LocSOE * INST is significant with a negative coefficient, which indicates that in a weaker institutional environment, local SOEs are significantly more likely to receive a clean opinion if they switch to a local (versus non-local) auditor after receiving a qualified opinion.
Robustness Testing
We perform the following secondary analyses to check the robustness of the main results to alternative definitions of the dependent and explanatory variables. First, we adopt the following alternatives to classify regions into institutionally weak or strong. We use the mean, rather than the median, index values. We also separately use two yearly indexes, 1999 and 2001, which respectively represent the midpoint of the sample period of Chan et al. 2006 and the current study. We also use the more recent indexes 2002-05. In addition, we delete five provinces immediately above and below the median mean of the marketization index i.e., examine only the top and bottom ten provinces.
Second, we employ a continuous rather than an indicator variable to measure the level of marketization. Third, we test each of the three sub-index variables in the regression rather than combining them. Fourth, we treat an audit firm as a local firm if the firm resides in the same jurisdiction as the client and more than 50 percent of the total number of its clients rather than total client assets come from the same jurisdiction as the audit firm e.g., Chan et al. 2006 . Fifth, we use 30 percent and 40 percent cutoffs, respectively, to determine the controlling ownership of a listed company. Finally, instead of treating an unqualified opinion with an explanatory paragraph as a qualified opinion, we exclude companies that received this type of opinion from the sample. The additional untabulated test results point to a single conclusion: lenient reporting by local auditors on local SOEs occurs in institutionally weak regions. 2 2 The results of robustness testing are available upon request. Journal of International Accounting Research 9:2 (2010); doi: 10.2308 /jiar.2010 .9.2.1 ISSN 1542 -6297 (Print) / 1558 Journal of International Accounting Research 9:2 (2010); doi: 10.2308 /jiar.2010 .9.2.1 ISSN 1542 -6297 (Print) / 1558 Copyright © American Accounting Association. Published online: Oct 2010 market environment are not in place to discipline auditors, audit quality may be compromised as the benefits of acquiescing to client requests outweigh the potential penalties arising from audit failures.
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Over the years, the Chinese government has implemented a number of measures to improve auditor independence. Our findings suggest that micro-level measures are useful but not sufficient.
Regulators in China and other transitional markets who wish to develop a credible independent auditing profession would find it beneficial to expend resources to improve institutions nationwide by considering government's role in business, legal and accounting infrastructures, corporate governance, and firm ownership diversification. The current financial crisis has led to an observable rise in government intervention in economies around the world which may be necessary in light of inadequate financial regulations in the past years. While the nature of such intervention is different from the intervention discussed herein, there are similarities in terms of government ownership of firms and government influence of management practices. Our research results indicate that the potential pitfalls of government intervention including auditor misreporting should not be underestimated in a weak institutional environment.
We note the following limitations of the study's findings, each of which provides a possible avenue of future inquiries. First, although we control for many factors that are expected to affect audit opinions, there may be other variables that need to be controlled. Second, we use audit opinions clean versus qualified as the only indicator of audit quality. Future research may use a range of opinions based on the level of severity or another proxy for audit quality. However, to accomplish this, a larger sample size is necessary. Third, we use only three NERI sub-indexes to capture the institutional development of a province/region. Future research could test the robustness of the current study's results by developing a more comprehensive measure of institutional development.
Finally, our findings are based on data from a single country. Future research is warranted to determine whether the findings can be generalized to other transitional or developing economies.
